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Abstract. In this paper, we build upon the model of two-party quantum computation introduced by Salvail
et al. [SSS09] and show that in this model, only trivial correct two-party quantum protocols are weakly self-
composable. We do so by defining a protocol Π calling any non-trivial sub-protocol pi N times and showing
that there is a quantum honest-but-curious strategy that cannot be modeled by acting locally in every single
copy of pi. In order to achieve this, we assign a real value called payoff to any strategy for Π and show that
that there is a gap between the highest payoff achievable by coherent and local strategies.
1 Introduction
The most striking result in quantum cryptography is certainly the capacity to perform secret-key dis-
tribution [BB84] securely by a universally composable quantum protocol [RK05,BHL+05]. This is in
sharp contrast with what is achievable using classical communication alone. A different class of crypto-
graphic primitives, called two-party computation, is not as easy to solve using quantum communication.
In fact, some two-party primitives are as impossible to achieve using quantum communication as they
are based solely on clasical communication. In particular, well-known two-party primitives like oblivi-
ous transfer [Lo97], bit commitment [May97,LC97], and fair coin-tossing [Kit03] have neither classical
nor quantum secure implementations. However, there exists weaker primitives achievable by quantum
protocols but impossible in the classical world. For instance, sharing an EPR pair allows for two play-
ers to implement a noisy version of a two-party primitive called non-local box (NLB) 4 with noise rate
sin2 π8 [PR94,BLM+05], which is a task impossible to achieve classically. Due to the local equivalence
between randomized NLB and randomized one-out-of-two oblivious transfer (1-2-OT) 5 [WW05b], a
noisy version of randomized 1-2-OT with noise rate sin2 π8 can also be obtained from one shared EPR-
pair while no such classical protocol exists.
The cryptographic power of quantum protocols for two-party computations have been investigated
in [SSS09]. Let Alice and Bob be the two parties involve in a two-party computation. In this model,
a primitive is modelled by a joint probability distribution PX,Y where Alice outputs x and Bob y with
probability PX,Y (x, y). Any two-party primitive can be randomized (the input to the functionality are
picked at random) so that its functionality is captured by an appropriate choice of PX,Y . We say that
PX,Y is trivial if it can be implemented by a correct classical protocol against honest-but-curious (HBC)
adversaries. Intuitively, a quantum protocol for primitive PX,Y is correct if once Alice and Bob get their
⋆ QUSEP, Quantum Security in Practice, funded by the Danish Natural Science Research Council.
4 NLB : (xA, yB) 7→ (aA, (a ⊕ xy)B), where x and y are Alice’s and Bob’s respective input bits, a is a uniformly random
output bit for Alice, and a⊕ xy is the output bit for Bob.
5 1-2-OT : ((x0, x1)A, cB) 7→ xBc , where x0 and x1 denote Alice’s input bits, c denotes Bob’s input bits, and xc denotes
Bob’s output bit.
respective outputs with joint probability PX,Y then nothing else is available to each party about the other
party’s output. Such a protocol can be purified and the measurements yielding the outcomes X and Y
can be postponed to the end of the protocol’s execution. The state of the protocol just before the final
measurements take place, is then called quantum embedding of the implemented primitive. In addition,
regular embedding of a primitive is defined to be an embedding where Alice and Bob do not posess any
other (auxiliary) registers than the ones used to measure their respective outputs. In [SSS09], it is shown
that although quantum protocols can implement correctly non-trivial functionalities they will always
leak extra information even against the weak class of honest-but-curious quantum adversaries. While
classical protocols can only implement trivial primitives, quantum protocols necessarily leak when they
correctly implement something non-trivial.
In this paper, we look at another aspect of two-party quantum protocols: their ability to compose
against quantum honest-but-curious adversaries (QHBC). In order to guarantee composability, the func-
tionality of a quantum protocol should be modeled by some classical ideal functionality. An ideal func-
tionality is a classical description of what the protocol achieves independently of the environment in
which it is executed. If a protocol does not admit such a description then it can clearly not be used in
any environment while keeping its functionality, and such a protocol would not compose securely in all
applications. In particular, in this thesis we investigate composability of non-trivial quantum protocols.
An embedding of PX,Y is called trivial if both parties can access at least the same amount of infor-
mation about the functionality as it is possible in some classical protocol for PX,Y in the HBC model.
Otherwise, it is said to be non-trivial. A quantum protocol is non-trivial if its bipartite purification re-
sults in a non-trivial embedding. We show that no non-trivial quantum protocol composes freely even if
the adversary is restricted to be honest-but-curious. No ideal functionality, even with an uncountable set
of rules, can fully characterize the behavior of a quantum protocol in all environments. This is clearly
another severe limit to the cryptographic power of two-party quantum protocols.
It is not too difficult to show that any trivial embedding can be implemented by a quantum protocol
that composes against QHBC adversaries. In the other direction, let |ψ(pi)〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB be a non-
trivial embedding of PX,Y corresponding to the bipartite purification of quantum protocol pi. We know
that |ψ(pi)〉 necessarily leaks information towards a QHBC adversary. Any ideal functionality IDπ for
protocol pi trying to account for honest-but-curious behaviors should allow to simulate all measurements
applied either in HA or HB through an appropriate call to IDπ. One way to do this is to define IDπ
by a function [0..1] × [0..1] 7→ [0..1] × [0..1] where IDπ(0, 0) corresponds to the honest behavior on
both sides: IDπ(0, 0) = (x, y) with probability PX,Y (x, y) where (x, y) is encoded as a pair of real
numbers. Other inputs to the ideal functionality allow for the simulation of different strategies mounted
by the QHBC adversary. In its most general form, an ideal functionality could have an uncountable set
of possible inputs in order to allow the simulation of all QHBC adversaries. We show that even allowing
for these general ideal functionalities, composed non-trivial protocols cannot be modeled by one single
ideal functionality. It means that for a protocol Π calling N times any non-trivial sub-protocol pi , there
is a QHBC strategy that cannot be modeled by arbitrarily many calls of IDπ , each of them acting locally
on a single copy of pi.
In order to achieve this, we provide a generic example of such a protocol. Protocol Π produces, as
output, a real-value p that we call payoff. The payoff p represents how well the adversary can compare,
without error, two factors of product states extracted from the N executions of protocol pi. From a result
of [KKB05], the product states are constructed in such a way that no individual measurement can do
as well as the best coherent measurement. It follows that the payoff corresponding to any adversary
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restricted to deal with pi through any ideal functionality would necessarily be lower than the one an
adversary applying coherent strategies on both parts of the product state could get. This implies that no
ideal functionality for pi would ever account for all QHBC strategies in Π . Moreover, the advantage of
coherent strategies over individual ones can be made constant. The result follows.
2 Preliminaries
CLASSICAL INFORMATION THEORY – DEPENDENT PART The following definition introduces a ran-
dom variable describing the correlation between two random variables X and Y .
Definition 2.1 (Dependent part [WW04]). For two random variables X,Y , let fX(x) := PY |X=x.
Then the dependent part of X with respect to Y is defined as X ց Y := fX(X).
The dependent part X ց Y is the minimum random variable from the random variables computable
from X such that X ↔ X ց Y ↔ Y is a Markov chain [WW04]. It means that for any random
variable K = f(X) such that X ↔ K ↔ Y is a Markov chain, there exists a function g such that
g(K) = X ց Y . Immediately from the definition we get several other properties of X ց Y [WW04]:
H(Y |X ց Y ) = H(Y |X), I(X;Y ) = I(X ց Y ;Y ), and X ց Y = X ց (Y ց X). The second
and the third formula yield I(X;Y ) = I(X ց Y ;Y ց X).
The notion of dependent part has been further investigated in [FWW04,IMNW04,WW05a]. Wullschleger
and Wolf have shown that quantities H(X ց Y |Y ) and H(Y ց X|X) are monotones for two-party
protocols[WW05a]. That is, none of these values can increase during classical two-party protocols. In
particular, if Alice and Bob start without sharing any non-trivial cryptographic resource then classical
two-party protocols can only produce (X,Y ) such that: H(X ց Y |Y ) = H(Y ց X|X) = 0, since
H(X ց Y |Y ) > 0 if and only if H(Y ց X|X) > 0 [WW05a]. Conversely, any primitive satisfying
H(X ց Y |Y ) = H(Y ց X|X) = 0 can be implemented securely in the honest-but-curious (HBC)
model. We call such primitives trivial.
QUANTUM INFORMATION THEORY AND STATE DISTINGUISHABILITY Let |ψ〉AB ∈ HAB be an
arbitrary pure state of the joint systems A and B. The states of these subsystems are ρA = trB |ψ〉〈ψ|
and ρB = trA |ψ〉〈ψ|, respectively. We denote by S(A) := S(ρA) and S(B) := S(ρB) the von Neumann
entropy (defined as the Shannon entropy of the eigenvalues of the density matrix) of subsystem A and B
respectively. Since the joint system is in a pure state, it follows easily from the Schmidt decomposition
that S(A) = S(B) (see e.g. [NC00]). Analogously to their classical counterparts, we can define quantum
conditional entropy S(A|B) := S(AB)− S(B), and quantum mutual information S(A;B) := S(A) +
S(B)− S(AB) = S(A) − S(A|B). Even though in general, S(A|B) can be negative, S(A|B) ≥ 0 is
always true if A is a classical random variable.
The following lemma gives a relation between the probability of error and the probability of conclu-
sive answer of a POVM used for discriminating two pure state.
Lemma 2.2 ([CB98]). Let the probability of a conclusive outcome and the error-probability of some
POVM applied to a state, sampled uniformly at random from a pair of pure states (|ψ0〉, |ψ1〉), be
denoted by qc and qerr, respectively. Then
qerr ≥ 1
2
(
qc −
√
q2c − (qc − 1 + |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|)2
)
.
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Notice that for the marginal case where qerr = 0 we get that qc ≤ 1−|〈ψ0|ψ1〉| [Iva87,Die88,Per88],
and for the marginal case where qc = 1 (no inconclusive answer is allowed) we get qerr ≥ 12 −√
1−|〈ψ0|ψ1〉|
2 [Hel76].
PURIFICATION All security questions we ask are with respect to (quantum) honest-but-curious adver-
saries. In the classical honest-but-curious adversary model (HBC), the parties follow the instructions of
a protocol but store all information available to them. Quantum honest-but-curious adversaries (QHBC),
on the other hand, are allowed to behave in an arbitrary way that cannot be distinguished from their
honest behavior by the other player.
Almost all impossibility results in quantum cryptography rely upon a quantum honest-but-curious
behavior of the adversary. This behavior consists in purifying all actions of the honest players. Purifying
means that instead of invoking classical randomness from a random tape, for instance, the adversary
relies upon quantum registers holding all random bits needed. The operations to be executed from the
random outcome are then performed quantumly without fixing the random outcomes. For example,
suppose a protocol instructs a party to pick with probability p state |φ0〉C and with probability 1 − p
state |φ1〉C before sending it to the other party through the quantum channel C . The purified version
of this instruction looks as follows: Prepare a quantum register in state √p|0〉R +
√
1− p|1〉R holding
the random process. Add a new register initially in state |0〉C before applying the unitary transform
U : |r〉R|0〉C 7→ |r〉R|φr〉C for r ∈ {0, 1} and send register C through the quantum channel and keep
register R.
From the receiver’s point of view, the purified behavior is indistinguishable from the one relying
upon a classical source of randomness because in both cases, the state of register C is ρ = p|φ0〉〈φ0| +
(1 − p)|φ1〉〈φ1|. All operations invoking classical randomness can be purified similarly[LC97,May97].
The result is that measurements are postponed as much as possible and only extract information required
to run the protocol in the sense that only when both players need to know a random outcome, the
corresponding quantum register holding the random coin will be measured. If both players purify their
actions then the joint state at any point during the execution will remain in pure state, until the very last
step of the protocol when the outcomes are measured.
CORRECT TWO-PARTY QUANTUM PROTOCOLS AND THEIR EMBEDDINGS In this section we define
when a protocol correctly implements a joint distribution PX,Y which may correspond to some standard
cryptographic task with uniformly random inputs. We call such a probability distribution primitive. As an
example of a primitive, we can take e.g. PX,Y such that for all x0, x1, y, c ∈ {0, 1}, PX,Y (x0, x1, c, y) =
1/8 if and only if y = xc. PX,Y then corresponds to a cryptographic task known as one-out-of-two
oblivious transfer (1-2-OT), first introduced by Wiesner [Wie83]. It lets Alice send two bits (x0, x1)
to Bob, of which he selects one (xc) to receive. In the randomized version, we assume the inputs x0,
x1, and c to be chosen uniformly at random. For standard cryptographic primitives such as 1-2-OT, the
version with inputs can be securely implemented from the randomized version [WW05b]. It follows that
for such primitives, considering the randomized version is without loss of generality.
As a result of purification of a protocol implementing primitive PX,Y , up to the point when the final
measurements take place, Alice and Bob obtain a shared pure state |ψ〉. Without loss of generality, we
may assume that the final measurements yielding the implemented probability distribution are in the
standard (computational) basis. Besides the registers A and B needed to compute X and Y , the players
could use auxiliary registers A′ and B′, yielding the final state ketψ to be inHAA′⊗HBB′ , where HAA′
and HBB′ denote the subsystems controlled by Alice and Bob, respectively. Informally, we call |ψ〉 an
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embedding of PX,Y , if the extra working registers A′ and B′ do not provide any extra information to
the honest players, measuring their respective registers A and B in the computational bases. By “extra
information” we mean additional information about the other party’s output, not available to a player
from the ideal functionality for PX,Y . A protocol whose purification produces an embedding of PX,Y
as the final state is then called correct protocol for PX,Y . Formally, we define an embedding of and a
correct protocol for a given primitive as follows:
Definition 2.3 ([SSS09]). A protocol pi for PX,Y is correct if its final state satisfies S(X;Y B′) =
S(XA′;Y ) = I(X;Y ) where X and Y are Alice’s and Bob’s honest measurement outcomes in the
computational basis and A′ and B′ denote the extra working registers of Alice and Bob. The state
|ψ〉 ∈ HAB ⊗ HA′B′ is called an embedding of PX,Y if it can be produced by the purification of a
correct protocol for PX,Y .
Correctness is a natural restriction imposed on two-party quantum protocols, since nothing can pre-
vent honest players to perform any measurement they wish in the systems which are not needed to
compute their desired outputs. In the following, we also use the notion of regular embedding which, as
it turns out, simplifies the analysis of two-party quantum protocols.
Definition 2.4 ([SSS09]). Regular embedding of PX,Y is an embedding where the auxiliary registers A′
and B′ are trivial.
[SSS09] shows that any embedding of PX,Y can be easily converted into its regular embedding by a
measurement performed on either side.
Lemma 2.5 ( [SSS09]). Let |ψ〉AA′BB′ be an embedding of PX,Y . Then |ψ〉 is locally equivalent to a
state |ψ∗〉 in the form:
|ψ∗〉 =
∑
k
λk|k, k〉A′B′ |ψk〉AB,
where λk are all nonnegative real numbers and for each k, |ψk〉 is a regular embedding of PX,Y .
It follows easily from the lemma above that Alice can convert |ψ〉 into a product state |ψk〉AB⊗|ϕ〉B′
by a proper measurement in register A′. An analogous statement holds for Bob.
Informally, an embedding |ψ〉AA′BB′ of PX,Y is called trivial, if it allows a dishonest player to
access at least the same amount of information as he/she is allowed in some classical implementation of
PX,Y . Formally, we define trivial and non-trivial embeddings of a given primitive as follows:
Definition 2.6 ([SSS09]). Let |ψ〉AA′BB′ be an embedding of PX,Y . We call |ψ〉 a trivial embedding of
PX,Y if it satisfies S(Y ց X|AA′) = 0 or S(X ց Y |BB′) = 0. Otherwise, we call it non-trivial.
Notice that PX,Y can be implemented by the following classical protocol:
1. Bob samples x′ = PY |XցY=x′ from the distribution PXցY and sends it to Alice. He samples y
from the distribution x′.
2. Alice samples x from the distribution PX|XցY=x′ .
Clearly, in the case where S(X ց Y |BB′) = 0, |ψ〉 allows dishonest Bob and Alice to access at
least as much information about the other party’s outputs, as they can in the classical implementation
above.
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3 Non-Trivial Protocols and Composability
In the following we show that quantum protocols even characterized only by the embeddings of the
corresponding primitives (i.e. without considering whether or not that state can be distributed fairly)
do not compose without allowing the adversary to mount joint attacks that cannot be simulated by
attacks applied to individual copies. We are allowed to make this simplification because any attack of an
embedding of a primitive can be modeled by an at least equally efficient (in terms of the amount of extra
information accessible by a cheater) attack of the associated protocol. We define trivial protocols to be
such that produce trivial embeddings.
Definition 3.1. A correct protocol for a primitive PX,Y is trivial, if the embedding produced by such a
protocol is trivial. Otherwise, it is called non-trivial.
In order to show non-composability of a non-trivial embedding |ψ〉 ∈ HABA′B of a primitive PX,Y ,
satisfying t Sψ(X ց Y |BB′) > 0 and Sψ(Y ց X|AA′) > 0, it is sufficient to show that no non-
trivial regular embedding of PX,Y can be composed, for the following reason: Lemma 2.5 shows that by
measuring register A′ of |ψ〉, Alice converts |ψ〉 into |ψk〉 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, which is a regular
embedding of PX,Y . If she performs such a measurement on many copies of |ψ〉, with high probability
at least some constant fraction of them collapses into the same non-trivial regular embedding of PX,Y .
Non-composability of such a regular embedding then implies non-composability of embedding |ψ〉 of
PX,Y . The protocol composability questions can therefore be reduced to investigating composability of
regular embeddings.
In the following, we formalize the weakness of non-composability inherent to any two-party quan-
tum protocol, preventing us from building strong cryptographic primitives even from non-trivial weak
ones. This is in a sharp contrast with quantum key distribution – a three-party game that can be shown
to be universally composable [BHL+05].
Composability of quantum protocols has been studied by Ben-Or and Mayers [BM02,BM04] and
by Unruh [Unr04]. The former approach is an extension of Canetti’s framework [Can01] to the quantum
case while the latter is an extension of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner [BPW04]. We are going to
consider a weaker version of composability called weak composability and show that almost no quantum
protocol satisfies it. Informally, we call a quantum two-party protocol weakly self-composable if any
adversarial strategy acting, possibly coherently, upon n independent copies of the protocol is equivalent
to a strategy which acts individually upon each copy of the protocol.
4 Ideal Functionalities
In order to guarantee composability, the functionality of a quantum protocol should be modeled by some
classical ideal functionality. An ideal functionality is a classical description of what the protocol achieves
independently of the environment in which it is executed. If a protocol does not admit such a description
then it can clearly not be used in any environment while keeping its functionality, and such a protocol
would not compose securely in all applications.
In the following, let HA and HB denote Alice’s and Bob’s quantum systems, respectively, and let X
and Y denote the set of classical outcomes of Alice’s and Bob’s final measurements.
Intuitively, a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB implements the ideal functionality IDψ if whatever the
adversary does on his/her part of |ψ〉, there exists a classical input to IDψ for the adversary that produces
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the same view. The ideal functionality IDψ accepts inputs for Alice and for Bob in [0..1], where the
elements of [0..1] encode all possible strategies for both parties. When a party inputs 0 to IDψ, the
outcome of measuring this party’s part of |ψ〉 in the computational basis, encoded by a number in [0..1]
is returned to the party. This corresponds to the honest behavior. When m ∈ [0..1] is input to IDψ , a
measurement depending upon m is applied to register HA (resp. HB) of |ψ〉 and the classical outcome
is returned to Alice (resp. Bob). Such a measurement acts only locally on the specified system. Clearly,
for IDψ to be of any cryptographic value, the set of possible strategies should be small, otherwise it
would be very difficult to characterize exactly what IDψ achieves. As we are going to show next, even if
|ψ〉 implements such an IDψ where [0..1] is used to encode all possible POVMs in HA and HB then all
adversarial strategies against |ψ〉⊗n cannot be modeled by calls to n copies of IDψ .
We write IDψ(m, 0) = (w˜, z) for the ideal functionality corresponding to pure state |ψ〉 ∈ HA⊗HB
with honest Bob and dishonest Alice using strategy m ∈ (0..1]. The output w˜ is provided to Alice and
z ∈ [0..1] encoding an event in Y to Bob. Similarly, we write IDψ(0,m) = (z, w˜) when Alice is honest
and Bob is dishonest and is using strategy m ∈ (0..1]. Notice that an ideal functionality for state |ψ〉 is
easy to implement by letting IDψ simulate Alice’s and Bob’s strategies through a classical interface.
In general, IDψ returns one party’s output as soon as its strategy has been specified. The ideal func-
tionality never waits for both parties before returning the outcomes. This models the fact that shared pure
states never signal from one party to the other. The ideal functionality IDψ can be queried by one party
more than once with different strategies. The ideal functionality keeps track of the residual state after
one strategy is applied. If a new strategy is applied then it is applied to the residual state. This feature
captures the fact that the first measurement can be applied before knowing how to refine it, which may
happen when Alice and Bob are involved in an interactive protocol using only classical communication
from shared state |ψ〉. Dishonest Alice may measure partially her part of |ψ〉 before announcing the out-
come to Bob. Bob could then send information to Alice allowing her to refine her measurement of |ψ〉
dependently of what she received from him. This procedure can be simulated using IDψ after specifying
a partial POVM for Alice’s first measurement among the set of POVMs encoded by the elements of
[0..1]. Then, Alice refines her first measurement by specifying a new POVM represented by an element
of [0..1] to the ideal functionality IDψ .
5 Simulation
A pure state |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB implements the ideal functionality IDψ if any attack implemented via
POVM M by adversary Alice (resp. adversary Bob) can be simulated by calling the ideal functionality
with some m ∈ [0..1]. The attack in the simulated world calls IDψ only once as it is in the real case. The
ideal functionality IDψ therefore refuses to answer more than one query per party. Remember also that
IDψ returns the outcome to one party as soon as the party’s strategy is specified irrespectively of whether
the other party has specified its own.
First, let us show on an example what do we mean by simulation of an attack using the calls to the
ideal functionality.
Example 5.1. Consider that Alice and Bob are sharing |Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) which is an embedding
of the joint probability distribution PX,Y with PX,Y (0, 0) = PX,Y (1, 1) = 1/2. Alice’s and Bob’s
honest measurement happen to be in the Schmidt basis. We can define the ideal functionality IDEPR as
follows:
IDEPR(0, 0) = (x, x) with prob. 12 .
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Since both players are measuring in the Schmidt basis, it follows that IDEPR models any adversarial
behavior. IDEPR is an ideal functionality for |Ψ+〉 even in a context where it is a part of a larger system.
However, |Ψ+〉 is a trivial embedding!
Notice that any strategy against |Ψ+〉⊗m can be simulated by appropriate calls to m copies of IDEPR .
In other words, |ψ+〉 is self-composable in a weak sense. In the following section we show that in fact,
all weakly self-composable regular embeddings of joint probability distributions are trivial.
6 Self-Composability of Embeddings
We define the classical weak self-composability of a regular embedding |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB of a joint
probability distribution PX,Y as its ability to be composed with itself without allowing the adversary to
get information about X resp. Y that is not available through calls to independent copies of IDψ .
Definition 6.1. Embedding |ψ〉 of PX,Y is weakly self-composable if there exists an ideal functionality
IDψ such that all attacks against |ψ〉⊗m for any m > 0 can be simulated by appropriate calls to m ideal
functionalities IDψ .
Next, we show that only (not necessarily all) trivial regular embeddings can be weakly self-composed.
The idea behind this result is the definition of a protocol computing a function, between Alice and Bob
sharing |ψ〉⊗m such that Bob can make the expected value of the function strictly larger provided he has
the capabilities to measure his part of |ψ〉⊗m coherently rather than individually. Only individual mea-
surements can be performed by Bob if IDψ is modelling the behavior of |ψ〉 in any situation. Consider
that Alice and Bob are sharing a non-trivial regular embedding |ψ〉 of PX,Y that can be written as:
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈X
√
PX(x)|x〉A|ψx〉B. (1)
We show in Lemma 6.2 that |ψ〉 being non-trivial (i.e. S(X ց Y |ρB) > 0 ) implies existence of
x0 6= x1 ∈ X such that
0 < |〈ψx0 |ψx1〉|2 < 1. (2)
Protocol 1 challenges Bob to identify in some sense the state of two positions chosen uniformly and at
random among the following possibilities:
{|ψx0〉|ψx0〉, |ψx0〉|ψx1〉, |ψx1〉|ψx0〉, |ψx1〉|ψx1〉}. We will show that Bob, restricted to interact with
his subsystem through the ideal functionality IDψ, cannot make the expected value of a certain function
as large as when it is allowed to interact unconditionally (i.e. coherently ) with his subsystem. We now
prove that such x0, x1 ∈ X exist for any non-trivial regular embedding.
Lemma 6.2. If |ψ〉 ∈ HA⊗HB is a non-trivial regular embedding of PX,Y then there exist x0, x1 ∈ X
such that |ψx0〉 and |ψx1〉 satisfy
0 < |〈ψx0 |ψx1〉| < 1.
Proof. Let us write |ψ〉 as,
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈X
√
PX(x)|x〉A|ψx〉B. (3)
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Let {|ψ∗1〉, . . . , |ψ∗ℓ 〉} ⊆ {|ψx〉}x∈X be the set of different states |ψx〉 available to Bob when Alice
measures X. Equation (3) can be re-written as,
|ψ〉 =
ℓ∑
j=1


∑
x∈X :
|ψx〉=|ψ∗j 〉
eiθ(x)
√
PX(x)|x〉

⊗
∣∣ψ∗j 〉, (4)
for some θ(x) ∈ [0 . . . 2pi).
If {|ψ∗j 〉}ℓj=1 are mutually orthogonal then if Bob measures in this basis no uncertainty aboutX ց Y
is left contradicting the fact that S(X ց Y |ρB) > 0.
In Protocol 1 Alice asks Bob to compare the two pure states on his side. In the next section we define
a game related to the state comparison problem and show that there is a coherent strategy which in this
game can succeed strictly better than any separable one, and therefore also LOCC strategy on Bob’s
registers.
CHALLENGE:
1. Let p := 0 and let Alice and Bob both know x0, x1 ∈ X such that 0 < |〈ψx0 |ψx1〉| = τ < 1 is satisfied.
2. Alice getsXm = X1, . . . , Xm by measuring her part in allm copies of |ψ〉 in the computational basis. She identifies
4 positions 1 ≤ i 6= i′, j 6= j′ ≤ m such that Xi = Xi′ = x0 and Xj = Xj′ = x1. If such four positions do not
exist then Alice announces to Bob that p = 0 and aborts.
3. Alice picks (h, h′) ∈ {i, i′, j, j′} with h 6= h′ such that (Xh, Xh′) = (α, β) with probability 1/4 for any choice of
α, β ∈ {x0, x1} and announces (h, h′) to Bob.
4. Bob sends b ∈ {0, 1, ?} to Alice, guessing whether the pair of pure states on the positions h, h′ is one of A0 :=
{|ψx0 〉|ψx0〉, |ψx1〉|ψx1〉}, A1 := {|ψx0〉|ψx1〉, |ψx1〉|ψx0〉}, or responds by “don’t know”.
5. Alice sets the payoff value p: p := −c if Bob responded incorrectly, p := 0 if he answered “don’t know”, and p := 1
if he answered the challenge correctly.
Fig. 1. A state comparison challenge to Bob.
7 State-Comparison Game with a Separably Inapproximable Coherent Strategy
Consider the challenge from Protocol 1. In the game defined by this protocol, Alice lets Bob compare
two states defined by a non-trivial regular embedding of a given primitive, which are either identical or
different, but not orthogonal. Bob is allowed to response inconclusively however, for such an answer
he obtains 0 points. On the other hand, if his guess is right, he obtains 1 point and if it is wrong,
he obtains −c points for some positive number c which we determine later. We call his score payoff.
With respect to the game defined by Protocol 1, let the maximal achievable expected payoff over the
set of all measurement strategies be denoted by pmax. In this section we show that there exists c such
that the maximal average payoff pmax can be only achieved with a strategy coherent on the registers
corresponding to the two factors of Bob’s product state. Furthermore, we show that for such a c there
is a constant gap between the maximal payoff achievable with a separable strategy and pmax. Separable
measurements on a quantum system consisting of two subsystems are such that any of their elements M
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is in the formM =
∑
i,j F
0
i ⊗F 1j , where F 0i , F 1j are the operators acting on the respective subsystems of
the given system. According to [BDF+99], separable measurements form a strict superset of all LOCC
measurements.
It is shown in [KKB05] that for 0 < τ < 1, the optimal no-error measurement is always coherent.
Furthermore, they prove that the highest success rate achievable by a separable unambiguous measure-
ment is (1− τ)2 whereas the optimal measurement has a success rate (1− τ).
Fix the value of 0 < τ < 1. For c sufficiently large the best coherent strategy is to apply the best
unambiguous measurement with the correct-answer rate 1−τ , and to output don’t know for an uncertain
result. Therefore, for some c we have pmax = 1− τ . Let ps denote the supremum of average payoffs in
the game from Protocol 1 achievable by separable strategies.
Theorem 7.1. In the game from Protocol 1 there exists c > 0 such that ps ≤ pmax − f(τ), where
f(τ) > 0 whenever 0 < τ < 1.
Before proving the actual theorem, we introduce a useful lemma.
Lemma 7.2. Let |ϕ0〉, |ϕ1〉 ∈ H be pure states such that |〈ϕ0|ϕ1〉| = τ . For a discrimination strategy
S with three possible outcomes 0, 1, and “don′t know”, let qc denote the probability of a conclusive
answer and qerr the probability of a wrong answer. Then,
qc ≤ 2qerr + 1− τ + 2
√
qerr(1− τ).
Proof. According to Lemma 2.2,
qerr ≥ 1
2
(
qc −
√
q2c − (qc − (1− cos θ))2
)
.
Equivalently, we get: √
q2c − (qc − (1− cos θ))2 ≥ qc − 2qerr.
By squaring both sides of the inequality we obtain:
2qc(1− cos θ)− (1− cos θ)2 ≥ q2c + 4q2err − 4qcqerr
q2c − qc(4qerr + 2(1 − τ)) + (1− τ)2 + 2q2err ≤ 0. (5)
By solving the quadratic equation
q2c − qc(4qerr + 2(1− τ)) + (1− τ)2 + 2q2err = 0,
we get the solutions 2qerr + 1− τ ± 2
√
qerr(1− τ), implying the solutions of (5) to be
qc ≤ 2qerr + 1− τ + 2
√
qerr(1− τ).
Proof ( Theorem7.1). The method we use is the following: For given parameters τ, c ∈ R such that
0 < τ < 1 and c > 0, and an additional parameter k > 0, we divide the set of all separable measurements
into three subsets according to the probability qerr of Bob’s incorrect (conclusive) answer in the state-
comparison, expressed as a function of c, k, and τ . We construct an upper bound on ps in each of the
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three sets separately and dependently on c, k, and τ . Finally, we find the conditions for c and k such that
in all three sets we get ps ≤ pmax − f(τ) for some f(τ) > 0.
[KKB05] shows that the best separable unambiguous strategy for solving the 2-out-of-2 state com-
parison problem is applying the best unambiguous measurements on each part of Bob’s register inde-
pendently. Lemma A.2 (see Appendix A) says that the payoff achieved by such a strategy in the case
where probability qerr is small, is close to the optimal payoff. The analysis of such a situation is captured
in the first of the three cases, where we consider the separable measurements with qerr ≤ 12k(c+1) .
1. (qerr ≤ 12k(c+1) ) Lemma A.2 shows that to any separable measurement M = (E0, E1, E?) with
probability of error qerr ≤ 12(c+1)k and the expected payoff p, there exists a separable measurement
M′ = (E′0, E′1, E′?) with the expected payoff p′, satisfying p ≤ p′ + 1k + O(1/
√
c), such that its
elements can be written in the form:
E′0 = G
0
0 ⊗G10 +G01 ⊗G11, E′1 = G00 ⊗G11 +G01 ⊗G10, E′? = 1− E′0 − E′1,
where the upper index of Gβα refers to the subsystem and the lower index determines the guess of the
state of the corresponding subsystem.
The upper bound on the value of p′ which we compute next, can then be used to upper bound p.
Consider an extended problem where Bob is supposed to identify each factor of his product state (in
contrast to just comparing the factors in the game). Let q0err, q1err, and q0c , q1c denote the probabilities of
Bob’s incorrect resp. conclusive answers in each of his subsystems. Then the probability of comparing
the states incorrectly can be expressed as follows:
qerr = q
0
err(q
1
c − q1err) + q1err(q0c − q1err) = q1cq0err + q1c q1err − 2q0errq1err.
For separable strategies for which q1c < 1− τ − 2/k or q0c < 1− τ − 2/k, we obtain p′ < 1− τ − 2/k
and hence, p < 1− τ − 1/k +O(1/√c) due to Lemma A.2. For c sufficiently large we then get:
pmax − p ≥ 1
2k
. (6)
Next, we discuss the case (not disjoint with the previous one) where both q0c , q1c ≥ 1−τ −1/k =: γ,
which implies that
qerr ≥ γ(q0err + q1err)− 2q0errq1err. (7)
For upper bounding the probability q0c of a conclusive answer of the measurementM′ we use Lemma 7.2
(an analogous formula holds for q1c ):
q0c ≤ 2q0err + 1− τ + 2
√
q0err(1− τ).
The probability of correct state-identification in the first of Bob’s subsystems then satisfies:
q0c − q0err ≤ q0err + 1− τ + 2
√
q0err(1− τ). (8)
Inequalities (7) and (8) give us an upper bound on p′ for c > 9:
p′ ≤ −cqerr + q0errq1err
+ (q0err + 1− τ + 2
√
q0err(1− τ))(q1err + 1− τ + 2
√
q1err(1− τ))
≤ −cqerr + (1− τ)2 + 2(
√
q0err +
√
q1err) + 9qerr
≤ (1− τ)2 + 4
√
qerr√
γ
≤ (1− τ)2 + 4√
2γk(c + 1)
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hence by Lemma A.2, p ≤ (1− τ)2 + 4√
2γk(c+1)
+ 1k +O(1/
√
c). For c sufficiently large we get:
p ≤ (1− τ)2 + 2
k
. (9)
2. Second, we assume that 12k(c+1) < qerr ≤ 1256(1−τ) . To upper bound the probability of comparing
the states correctly, we use the same argument as in (8) and get that:
qc − qerr ≤ qerr + 1− τ + 2
√
qerr(1− τ),
where qc denotes the probability of a conclusive outcome. This inequality implies the upper bound on p:
p ≤ −cqerr + (qc − qerr) ≤ −c− 1
c+ 1
· 1
2k
+ 1− τ + 2
√
qerr(1− τ),
yielding that for c sufficiently large,
p ≤ − 1
2k
+ 1− τ + 2
√
qerr(1− τ). (10)
Consequently, we have three upper bounds on the value of p, given by (6), (9), and (10):B0 := 1−τ− 12k ,
B1 := (1− τ)2+ 2k , and B2 := 1− τ +2
√
qerr(1− τ)− 12k . Since B2 ≥ B0, we only have to find f(τ)
and k such that B1, B2 ≤ (1− τ)− f(τ), or equivalently:
2f(τ) + 4
√
qerr(1− τ) ≤ 1
k
≤ τ(1− τ)− f(τ)
2
5
2
f(τ) ≤ τ(1− τ)
2
− 4
√
qerr(1− τ).
It is easy to verify that for d ≤ 1256(1−τ) , the two inequalities are satisfied for k := 209τ(1−τ) and f(τ) :=
τ(1−τ)
10 . Thus, there exists c > 0 such that in any separable strategy with the probability of error qerr ≤
1
256(1−τ) and the expected payoff p:
p ≤ pmax − τ(1− τ)
10
.
3. For separable strategies with the probability of error qerr > 1256(1−τ) , we can simply set c >
256(1 − τ) which ensures that the payoff p ≤ 0.
Set c to be the maximum over the values required by the discussed subcases. For such a c and any
separable strategy, the corresponding expected payoff p satisfies p ≤ pmax − τ(1−τ)10 , yielding that
pmax − ps ≥ τ(1− τ)
10
.
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8 Only Trivial Embeddings Can Be Composed
As a straightforward corollary of Theorem 7.1, we now get that there exists a constant c such that
any Bob restricted to interact with his system through the ideal functionality ID⊗mψ can never get the
expected value of p as large and not even close as with the best coherent strategy. This remains true
for any possible description of the ideal functionality since even if IDψ allowed to specify an arbitrary
POVM then the ideal functionality would not be as good as the best coherent strategy.
Notice that any strategy Bob may use for querying the ideal functionality IDψ for both systems
involved in order to pass the challenge with success, can also be carried by two parties restricted to local
quantum operation and classical communication (LOCC). This is because IDψ only returns classical
information. Local quantum operations can be performed by asking IDψ to apply a POVM to a local part
of |ψ〉.
We now formally prove that non-trivial regular embeddings do not compose since Bob can always
succeed better in Protocol 1 if he could measure all his registers coherently.
Theorem 8.1. Only trivial regular embeddings of a primitive PX,Y are weakly self-composable.
Proof. Let |ψ〉 = ∑x∈X √PX(x)|x〉|ψx〉 be a non-trivial regular embedding of PX,Y . According to
Lemma 6.2 there exist x0, x1 ∈ X such that 0 < |〈ψx0 |ψx1〉| < 1. Theorem 7.1 then implies that
there is c ∈ R+ such that in Protocol 1 played with |ψx0〉 and |ψx1〉 satisfying the condition above, the
expected payoff achievable by the best coherent strategy is strictly better than what can be achieved by
separable i.e. also LOCC strategies. By definition of weak self-composability it means that non-trivial
regular embedding |ψ〉 of PX,Y is not weakly self-composable.
Corollary 8.2. Only trivial (correct) two-party quantum protocols are weakly self-composable.
Proof. The statement follows from the fact that any quantum honest-but-curious attack of an embedding
can be modeled by an attack of the corresponding two-party protocol. Lemma 2.5 shows that for any
party there is a measurement converting a regular embedding |ψ〉 ∈ HABA′B′ of a primitive PX,Y into
an embedding |ψk〉 of PX,Y for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. The other party can also learn the index k by
measuring his/her additional register. Non-composability of non-trivial quantum two-party protocols for
PX,Y then follows from non-composability of non-trivial regular embeddings of PX,Y by including a
pre-stage into the game from Protocol 1. In this stage, Alice and Bob convert each of the many embed-
dings of PX,Y corresponding to the protocol copies into a regular embedding of PX,Y known to both
parties. This conversion results into a non-trivial regular embedding of PX,Y with constant probability.
This is because if all regular embeddings in the conversion-range were trivial, then the measurement
converting the embedding into regular embeddings could be used as a part of a measurement revealing
X ց Y completely to Bob, or revealing Y ց X completely to Alice. Hence, such an embedding and
the corresponding protocol would then be trivial. Due to the law of large numbers, from several copies
of an embedding Alice obtains at least some constant fraction of the same non-trivial regular embed-
dings except of probability negligible in the number of copies. Alice and Bob then play the game from
Protocol 1, using the subset of copies where Alice obtained the same non-trivial regular embedding.
Finally, let us mention several facts related particularly to (non-)composability of trivial two-party
quantum protocols implementing trivial primitives. Clearly, every trivial primitive has a protocol which
is composable against quantum honest-but-curious adversaries, namely the classical one implementing
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the primitive securely in the HBC model. Formally, for a trivial PX,Y we show composability of quantum
protocols implementing only PXցY,YցX (which corresponds to secure implementation in the HBC
model) instead of PX,Y , where the desired distribution PX,Y is obtained from the implementation of
PXցY,YցX by local randomization. Since a trivial primitive satisfies H(X ց Y |Y ց X) = H(Y ց
X|X ց Y ) = 0 or in other words, the implemented dependent parts are accessible to both parties
already in one protocol copy, coherent attacks do not help in getting any more information. Because
the rest of X and Y is computed purely locally, there is no attack, individual or coherent, revealing any
information about the result of this operation.
On the other hand, not all protocols for trivial primitives are composable. As an example let us take a
protocol for a primitive PX,Y defined by PX,Y (0, 0) = PX,Y (1, 0) = 3/8, PX,Y (0, 1) = PX,Y (1, 1) =
1/8, represented by the following regular embedding:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
|0〉 ⊗
(√
3
2
|0〉+ 1
2
|1〉
)
+
1√
2
|1〉 ⊗
(√
3
2
|0〉 − 1
2
|1〉
)
.
Such an embedding (and therefore, the corresponding protocol) is trivial because it implements a trivial
primitive. Formally, 0 = H(X ց Y |Y ) and H(X ց Y |Y ) ≥ S(X ց Y |B) imply that S(X ց
Y |B) = 0. On the other hand, the states
|ψ0〉 :=
√
3
2
|0〉+ 1
2
|1〉, |ψ1〉 :=
√
3
2
|0〉 − 1
2
|1〉
that Bob gets for Alice’s respective outcomes 0 and 1 of the measurement in the canonical basis, satisfy
the condition 0 < |〈ψ0|ψ1〉| < 1 from Protocol 1. Hence, the arguments from the proof of Theorem 7.1
apply, yielding that |ψ〉 cannot be composed.
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A Lemma A.2 from the proof of Theorem 7.1
Before starting with the actual Lemma A.2, we formulate and prove an auxiliary lemma, needed for
the main proof. In the following, ‖T‖∞ denotes the norm of an operator T ∈ Cn×n, which equals the
operator’s largest singular value.
Lemma A.1. Let f : R+ → C2×2 be a function mapping c positive into a positive-semidefinite operator
Fc ∈ C2×2 such that ‖Fc‖∞ = 1 and for some unit vector |v0〉 ∈ C2, 〈v0|Fc|v0〉 ∈ O(1/c). Then the
dominant eigenvector of Fc is of the form γc0|v0〉 + γc1|v1〉, where 〈v0|v1〉 = 0, |γc0|2 + |γc1|2 = 1, and
|γc0|2 ∈ O(1/c). Furthermore, the second largest eigenvalue λc of Fc satisfies λc ∈ O(1/c).
15
Proof. Let us write Fc in the form: Fc = M †cMc, for a matrix Mc ∈ C2×2. This is possible due to
the fact that Fc is positive-semidefinite. We define |u0〉 : = Mc|v0〉 and |u1〉 : = Mc|v1〉. According
to the assumption, 〈u0|u0〉 ∈ O(1/c). Let us write the (unit) dominant eigenvector of Fc in the basis
{|v0〉, |v1〉} as:
|w〉 = γc0|v0〉+ γc1|v1〉.
It follows that
1 = 〈w|Fc|w〉 = |γc0|2〈u0|u0〉+ |γc1|2〈u1|u1〉+ 2Re(γc0γc1〈u0|u1〉).
Assume that there exists an unbounded increasing sequence of positive numbers such that for its
elements c, we get |γc1|2 = 1 − Θ(1/cδ) for 1/2 ≤ δ < 1. From 〈u0|u0〉 ∈ O(1/c) we get that
|γ¯c0γc1〈u0|u1〉| ∈ Θ(1/cδ) and |〈u0|u1〉| ∈ O(1/
√
c), yielding that
|γc0| ∈ ω(1/cδ−1/2).
Since |w〉 is a unit vector, for some k positive, we get
1 = |γc1|2 + |γc0|2 ≥ 1−
k
cδ
+ |γc0|2,
and thus, |γc0|2 ∈ O(1/cδ). From the two conditions we conclude that
|γc0|2 ∈ ω(1/c2δ−1) ∩O(1/cδ),
yielding that δ = 1, since the intersection of the two sets has to be non-empty. Therefore, the function f
satisfies
|γc0|2 ∈ O(1/c) (11)
on the entire domain.
Now we upper bound the second largest eigenvalue of Fc. Since the second eigenvector |w⊥〉 of Fc
is orthogonal to its dominant eigenvector, it can be written in the form:∣∣∣w⊥〉 = γ˜c1|v0〉+ γ˜c0|v1〉,
where |γ˜c1| = |γc1| and |γ˜c0| = |γc0|. We get that
λc =
〈
w⊥
∣∣∣Fc∣∣∣w⊥〉 = |γ˜c1|2〈u0|u0〉+ |γ˜c0|2〈u1|u1〉+ 2Re(γ˜c1γ˜c0〈u0|u1〉).
From the assumption 〈u0|u0〉 ∈ O(1/c) and (11) we conclude that
λc ∈ O(1/c).
Lemma A.2. Let c, k > 0. Consider the game from Prot. 1 and let X and Y denote the respective
registers of Bob, corresponding to Alice’s choices of h and h′. To any strategy based on the outcomes of
a separable measurement M = (E0, E1, E?) on HX ⊗HY with probability of error qerr ≤ 12(c+1)k and
the expected payoff p, there exists a strategy using a separable measurement M′ = (E′0, E′1, E′?) in the
form:
E′0 = G
0
0 ⊗G10 +G01 ⊗G11, E′1 = G00 ⊗G11 +G01 ⊗G10, E′? = 1− E′0 − E′1
with the expected payoff p′, satisfying:
|p− p′| ∈ 1
k
+O(1/
√
c).
16
Proof. For simplicity of the notation, let us define |ψ0〉 := |ψx0〉 and |ψ1〉 := |ψx1〉, where |ψx0〉 and
|ψx1〉 come from Prot. 1.
Every element of a separable measurement on HX ⊗HY can be written as a sum of tensor products
of positive semi-definite operators. In particular, the elements of M can be written in the form:
Eb(x,y) :=
∑
x,y
F 0b(x,y),x ⊗ F 1b(x,y),y.
Operators F 0b(x,y),x ⊗ F 1b(x,y),y can be viewed as the elements of a new measurement N , refining M.
Since the states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 span a 2-dimensional Hilbert space, all operators F 0bx,y ,x and F 1bx,y,y can
be restricted to correspond to 2× 2 matrices in some basis of this space.
The function b : (x, y)→ {0, 1, ?} is a post-processing function of the outcomes of N , determining
the outcome of M (0 corresponds to the states being equal, 1 to them being different, and ? denotes
an inconclusive answer). Let A denote the sets of all pairs (x, y) of outcomes of N . To every pair
(x, y) ∈ A we assign (q0x, q1y) ∈ [0, 1/2]2 – the probabilities of error in guessing the factor states of HX
and HY , conditioned on measuring x and y, respectively. Let W0 and W1 denote the random variables
assigned to the states of HX and HY , respectively. The probability space of both W0 and W1 is {0, 1},
since the state of either of the subsystems is |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉. For ζ ∈ {0, 1}, let x → ζ , y → ζ stand for
Pr[W0 = 1− ζ|x],Pr[W1 = 1− ζ|y] ≤ 12(c+1) , respectively, where the probabilities are conditioned on
the outcomes of N in the respective subsystems. Consider measurement M∗ := (E∗0 , E∗1 , E∗? ) with the
same refined set of outputs A as M (which now will be indexed differently) in the following form:
E∗0 = E
∗
0,0 + E
∗
1,1, E
∗
1 = E
∗
0,1 + E
∗
1,0, E
∗
? = I− E∗0 − E∗1 ,
where
E∗α,β :=
∑
x→α,y→β
F 0α,x ⊗ F 1β,y. (12)
We show that the difference of the expected payoff p of M and the expected payoff p∗ of M∗ satisfies:
|p− p∗| ≤ 1
k
. (13)
Since the refined sets of possible outcomes of both M∗ and M are the same, the two measurements
only differ in the post-processing functions denoted by b and b∗, respectively. In other words,M∗ differs
from M in the arrangement of the same set of summands in the three sums defining measurement
elements (E0, E1, E?) and (E∗0 , E∗1 , E∗? ).
Consider any strategy which upon measuring (x, y) yields a conclusive answer. For the correspond-
ing expected payoff px,y conditioned on measuring (x, y) we then get:
px,y = (1− q0x)(1− q1y) + q0xq1y − c(q0x(1− q1y) + (1− q0x)q1y)
= 1− (c+ 1)(q0x + q1y − 2q0xq1y). (14)
If on the other hand, measuring (x, y) implies the answer of M to be inconclusive, the expected
payoff conditioned on measuring (x, y) will be 0. Consequently, the optimal post-processing strategy
(with the maximum payoff) should output b(x, y) =? for every (x, y) satisfying q0x+ q1y− 2q0xq1y > 1c+1 ,
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otherwise it outputs a conclusive answer. In particular, the output should be inconclusive for all pairs
(x, y) such that q0x > 1c+1 or q
1
y >
1
c+1 , and conclusive if both q
0
x, q
1
y ≤ 12(c+1) .
However, only the knowledge that (q0x, q1y) ∈ [0, 1c+1 ]2 \ [0, 12(c+1) ]2 does not allow us to determine
what is the best output in order to maximize the payoff. We analyze this problem with respect to the
probability of error allowed for the post-processing function.
We assume that the answer of N with the post-processing function b can be false with probability
at most qerr ≤ 12k(c+1) . According to Markov’s inequality, measuring (x, y) such that either q0x > kqerr
or q1y > kqerr does not allow to output a conclusive answer with probability larger than 1/k. Thus, for
either q0x > 12(c+1) or q
1
y >
1
2(c+1) , the answer cannot be conclusive with probability larger than 1/k.
In the latter we analyze the difference of the expected payoffs for the post-processing function b and
for a newly defined b∗ such that for any (x, y) satisfying q0x > 12(c+1) or q
1
y >
1
2(c+1) , the output is
b∗(x, y) =?.
Consider every pair (x, y) such that by modifying b(x, y) into b∗(x, y), px,y decreases and compute
the difference of px,y and p∗xy in this case. We have that either q0x ∈ ( 12(c+1) , 1c+1 ] or q1y ∈ ( 12(c+1) , 1c+1 ],
yielding that
px,y = 1− (c+ 1)(q0x + q1y − 2q0xq1y) <
1
2
.
It means that for every pair (x, y) for which the value of the post-processing function was modified, px,y
decreased by at most 1/2. However, since the answer of M is false with probability at most qerr, the
functions b and b∗ cannot differ anywhere except for a set of (x, y) measured with probability at most
1/k, concerning that qerr ≤ 12k(c+1) . This gives us
|p− p∗| ≤ 1
k
. (15)
We have shown that a separable measurement M can be approximated by a separable measurement
M∗ in the special form. In the following we show that M∗ can be approximated by a measurement in
the form from the statement up to a difference in payoffs which is in O(1/
√
c). The statement of the
lemma then follows from the triangle inequality.
Our next goal is to construct a measurement M′ = (E′0, E′1, E′?) in the form:
E′0 = G
0
00 ⊗G100 +G011 ⊗G111, E′1 = G001 ⊗G101 +G010 ⊗G110, E′? = I− E′0 − E′1,
approximating the measurementM∗ with respect to the expected payoff. In the definition of the elements
of M′, the upper index of Gζab specifies the subsystem, the first bit of the lower index determines the
outcome in the first subsystem, and the second bit of the lower index determines the outcome in the
second subsystem.
Consider the previously constructed measurementM∗. Fix α, β ∈ {0, 1} and define F 0x := F
0
α,x
‖F 0α,x‖∞ ,
F 1y :=
F 1
β,y
‖F 1
β,y
‖∞ , µx,y := ‖F
0
α,x‖∞ · ‖F 1β,y‖∞. First, we construct positive-semidefinite operators G˜0α,β ⊗
G˜1α,β , approximating
E∗α,β =
∑
x→α,y→β
µx,yF
0
x ⊗ F 1y
(defined by (12)), where the guesses of α and β conditioned on measuring F 0x and F 1y are incorrect with
probability at most 12(c+1) . We require these operators to satisfy:
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1. pE∗
α,β
= pG˜0
α,β
⊗G˜1
α,β
, where pE∗
α,β
and pG˜0
α,β
⊗G˜1
α,β
denote the expected payoffs conditioned on mea-
suring E∗α,β and G˜0α,β ⊗ G˜1α,β , respectively.
2. For all ζ0, ζ1, α, β ∈ {0, 1} :∣∣∣〈ψζ0 , ψζ1 |G˜0α,β ⊗ G˜1α,β|ψζ0 , ψζ1〉 − 〈ψζ0 , ψζ1 |E∗α,β |ψζ0 , ψζ1〉∣∣∣ ∈ O(1/√c),
3. ‖∑α,β G˜0α,β ⊗ G˜1α,β‖∞ ∈ 1 +O(1/c).
We now describe the construction of operators G˜0α,β and G˜1α,β . The respective dominant eigenvectors
of F 0x and F 1y can be written as
|w0〉 = γ00,x|ψ1−α〉+ γ01,x
∣∣∣ψ⊥1−α〉,
|w1〉 = γ10,y|ψ1−β〉+ γ11,y
∣∣∣ψ⊥1−β〉,
where for each ζ ∈ {0, 1}, |ψ⊥ζ 〉 denotes the unit vector spanned by |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉, orthogonal to |ψζ〉.
According to Lemma A.1, there exists κ positive such that for each x and y, |γ00,x|2 ≤ κc and |γ10,y|2 ≤ κc .
We define operators G˜0α,β and G˜1α,β by
G˜0α,β :=
(
1− κ
c
)
·
√∑
x,y
µx,y
∣∣∣ψ⊥1−α〉〈ψ⊥1−α∣∣∣+ ν0(c)|ψ1−α〉〈ψ1−α|,
G˜1α,β :=
(
1− κ
c
)
·
√∑
x,y
µx,y
∣∣∣ψ⊥1−β〉〈ψ⊥1−β∣∣∣+ ν1(c)|ψ1−β〉〈ψ1−β |
for non-negative functions ν0, ν1 ∈ O(1/c) chosen to be such that
pE∗
α,β
= pG˜0
α,β
⊗G˜1
α,β
.
Such a choice of parameters is possible, due to the fact the the probability of a wrong guess, conditioned
on the outcome E∗α,β is in O(1/c). Since operators {E∗α,β}α,β form a valid POVM, after projecting them
by a projector P := |ψ⊥1−α〉〈ψ⊥1−α| ⊗ |ψ⊥1−β〉〈ψ⊥1−β |, we get a valid POVM on the support of P . In other
words, {PE∗α,βP}α,β form a POVM and therefore, also the operators
Jα,β :=
(
1− κ
c
)
·

 ∑
x→α,y→β
µx,y

∣∣∣ψ⊥1−α〉〈ψ⊥1−α∣∣∣⊗ ∣∣∣ψ⊥1−β〉〈ψ⊥1−β∣∣∣,
lower-bounding PE∗α,βP , form valid POVMs. From the condition
‖
∑
α,β
Jα,β‖∞ ≤ 1,
we conclude that
‖
∑
α,β
G˜0α,β ⊗ G˜1α,β‖∞ ∈ 1 +O(1/c). (16)
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It remains to show that
∀ζ0, ζ1, α, β ∈ {0, 1} :
∣∣∣〈ψζ0 , ψζ1 |G˜0α,β ⊗ G˜1α,β|ψζ0 , ψζ1〉 − 〈ψζ0 , ψζ1 |E∗α,β|ψζ0 , ψζ1〉∣∣∣ ∈ O(1/√c).
By definition of G˜0α,β and G˜1α,β , this is true if ζ0 6= α or ζ1 6= β. We now discuss the remaining case.
It follows from Lemma A.1, applied to each F 0x ⊗ F 1y and the construction of G˜0α,β ⊗ G˜1α,β that∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
x→α,y→β
µx,yF
0
x ⊗ F 1y − G˜0α,β ⊗ G˜1α,β
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
∈ O(1/√c).
Hence, also ∣∣∣〈ψα, ψβ |G˜0α,β ⊗ G˜1α,β |ψα, ψβ〉 − 〈ψα, ψβ |E∗α,β|ψα, ψβ〉∣∣∣ ∈ O(1/√c).
We have defined a set of operators {G˜0α,β ⊗ G˜1α,β}α,β , almost forming a POVM due to the condition
(iii). Therefore, we can re-scale the elements of the set by a factor in 1 − O(1/c), and thereby create
a POVM {G0α,β ⊗ G1α,β}α,β . Due to the condition (i), the expected payoffs conditioned on measuring
either E∗α,β orG0α,β⊗G1α,β are the same. Finally, due to the condition (ii), the probabilities of measuring
an outcome from {E∗α,β}α,β and an outcome from {G0α,β ⊗ G1α,β}α,β differ by a value in O(1/
√
c).
Hence, if the probability of a conclusive answer of M∗ is constant then the measurement with elements
E′′0 := G
0
0,0 ⊗G10,0 +G01,1 ⊗G11,1, E′′1 := G00,1 ⊗G10,1 +G01,0 ⊗G11,0, E′′? := I− E′0 − E′1
gives a conclusive answer with probability lower by at most a value inO(1/
√
c), and differs fromM∗ in
its payoff by a value in O(1/
√
c). According to [KKB05], the state of each of the two subsystems after
applying the measurement given above is independent of the outcome in the other one. Therefore, in
order to achieve certain expected payoff, the local measurements can be optimized separately. It follows
that the payoff of measurement (E′′0 , E′′1 , E′′? ) can be matched by the payoff p′ of some measurement
M′ in the form:
E′0 = G
0
0 ⊗G10 +G01 ⊗G11, E′1 = G00 ⊗G11 +G01 ⊗G10, E′? = I− E′0 − E′1.
By applying (13) and the triangle inequality, we finally get that
|p− p′| ∈ O(1/k) +O(1/√c).
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